A Constitutional Perspective on Venezuelan Democratization

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A central aspect of the current efforts toward democratic re-institutionalization in Venezuela consists of making decisions that will restore a constitutional framework for the political process. The situation that arose following January 3, 2026, has amplified the factual dimension and minimized the legal one, which was already compromised. Empowered international actors have identified three phases that should be followed: recovery, stabilization, and transition; this has subsequently been endorsed by various national political actors. However, it is unclear how long each phase will last or what exactly it entails, and determining this seems beyond our reach. After reviewing the current circumstances in the areas of human rights and institutional-legislative matters, I will offer some reflections on certain conditions necessary to underpin democratization.

Human Rights and the Amnesty Law

Repression has decreased, as has political persecution. The announcement of the amnesty law raised some hopes, and its drafting involved a broader consultation process than has been customary in recent years. The enacted version improved upon the originally proposed legislation in some respects. This law has allowed for the release of several individuals detained for political reasons, in addition to others who had been released through other legal proceedings before the law took effect or who have been released since then. Opposition leaders have returned to the country, some to benefit from the amnesty law. However, several NGOs have denounced the law’s limitations, its exclusions, the discretionary nature of its application, and its failure to comply with international standards. In particular, they object to the disregard for the right to the truth of those who have been released after suffering arbitrary deprivation of liberty—as well as that of other victims of human rights violations—and for the right to justice and reparations, along with the absence of guarantees against repetition. There are still people detained for political reasons.

The main social grievance stems from the fact that, despite the releases from detention or imprisonment, the repressive laws and apparatus have not been dismantled. The political liberalization the country needed was limited to ending certain unjust measures, but the powers that would allow for the reimposition of similar measures have not been abandoned. At the same time, it must be taken into account that the scope of action for current authorities and officials—including regarding the use of police force and criminal prosecution—has narrowed as a result of the presence of new, empowered bodies. Social protest has increased, and there are more spaces for debate on social and political issues. Some media outlets are giving space to a greater diversity of opinions and information, including those of a political nature and content critical of the government, though still subject to limits and forms of censorship. Several opposition political parties are holding assemblies in different parts of the country and are regrouping their supporters, although they are not formally recognized. The sociopolitical landscape is unfolding amid this ambiguity and under this patronizing influence.

Legislative Output and the Institutional Framework

Apart from the amnesty law, legislative priorities have focused on economic legislation, particularly the reform of the Organic Law on Hydrocarbons. Even before that amnesty law was enacted, the reform of the latter had already been passed; it was expedited through the National Assembly with minimal debate and opaque consultations. It is believed that the legal reform favors the operations of U.S. and other regional companies in the hydrocarbons sector by establishing a regime of broad private-capital participation in these activities, breaking with the previous paradigm and raising some doubts regarding its constitutionality. All these substantial changes—in a matter of such great importance to Venezuela—were approved without due public deliberation. This reflects the way in which the legislative function is exercised on issues prioritized by international actors, without safeguarding national interests. Similarly, the Organic Law for the Streamlining and Optimization of Administrative Procedures and the Mining Law were enacted.

At the institutional level, the resignations of the Attorney General of the Republic and the Ombudsman raised expectations, but in the end, the appointment made at the Attorney General’s Office resulted in a realignment within the regime, while the one at the Office of the Ombudsman marked a tentative opening. Furthermore, a selection process for justices of the Supreme Court of Justice is currently underway, linked to a reform of the Organic Law governing this judicial body, which increases the court’s membership from the current 20 to 32. Previously, there had been increases and reductions in the composition of this body for the purpose of political control. The ongoing selection process has shortcomings, as it is unclear exactly how many vacancies will be filled and in which chambers; and, most critically, the process lacks the necessary conditions of reliability and transparency, as well as an objective evaluation of merit and the commitment to establishing an independent Supreme Court of Justice. There is a risk that, in essence, quotas will be distributed among the parties represented in the National Assembly, with a few spots reserved for independent candidates.

Agenda for Democratic Re-institutionalization

All indications suggest that the reforms that have taken place have served more to reshuffle the deck than to genuinely open up the structures of power. There is uncertainty about the future, and, in particular, it is unclear whether a transition to democracy is on the horizon. It is possible to drive this forward with an agenda for democratization. Clearly, underpinning democratization in Venezuela involves linking diverse spheres of action—social, economic, and political; national and international. It requires broad participation by civil society and political pluralism. I have addressed the specific points of this agenda—divided into three major interdependent spheres: human rights, the rule of law, and human rights—elsewhere. Here, I will mention only a few elements of the social and political foundation for transformative measures, particularly those related to the constitutional and institutional spheres.

To make proper progress on reforms, it is necessary to consolidate social spaces for discussion and proposals that bring together initiatives from networks of NGOs, other civil society organizations, churches, universities, labor unions, and grassroots organizations, in order to strengthen the efforts currently being carried out separately. We must also foster genuine forums for political dialogue, with the aim of facilitating agreements that allow us to take steps toward building the institutional framework of a rule-of-law state, with fundamental changes grounded in the independence of the judiciary and other oversight bodies. The issue of elections must also be addressed, following the renewal of the National Electoral Council and with guarantees for free, fair, and verifiable elections. This presupposes the recognition of political organizations and the removal of arbitrary barriers to candidacy, as well as previously agreed-upon post-election guarantees for all candidates—particularly for those who do not fare well in the election—in order to promote pluralism and peace in the post-election period and during a potential transfer of power.