This project analyzes the role of judges and courts in democratic resilience, comparing how laws and legal cultures concerning judicial autonomy and tenure influence the capacity and willingness of judicial institutions to withstand attacks and safeguard democracy. Using a comparative intraregional approach examining cases such as Hungary, Poland, Mexico, and Argentina, and a transregional approach between Latin America and Europe, it explores the implementation of judicial council models (for example Italian and Spanish) and different forms of instability in office, such as lowering retirement ages, court packing, or forced resignations. The project also considers the interaction of judges and courts with supranational bodies, the impact of international judicial networks, and the role of soft law norms, with the aim of understanding how law can function as a tool for maintaining, adapting, and transforming democracy in the face of institutional erosion.
Project members
Region / Focus
Eastern Europe + Latin America
Bibliography
Tenure and independence:
- Pérez-Liñán, A., & Castagnola, A. (2024). Judicial tenure and retirements. In L. Epstein et al. (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Judicial Behaviour. Oxford University Press.
- Kosař, D., & Spáč, S. (2025). Judicial independence. In R. Bellamy & J. King (Eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory (pp. 867–883). Cambridge University Press.
- Kosař, D., & Šipulová, K. (2023). Comparative court-packing. International Journal of Constitutional Law, 21(1), 80–126.
- Ríos-Figueroa, J., & Staton, J. K. (2014). An evaluation of cross-national measures of judicial independence. Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 30(1), 104–137.
Courts against backsliding:
- Gamboa, L., García-Holgado, B., & González-Ocantos, E. (2024). Courts against backsliding: Lessons from Latin America. Law & Policy, 1–22.
- Šipulová, K. (2025). The light and the dark side of judicial resistance. Law & Policy, 47(1), e12247.
- Puleo, L., & Coman, R. (2023). Explaining judges’ opposition when judicial independence is undermined: Insights from Poland, Romania, and Hungary. Democratization, 31(1), 47–69. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2255833
- Ríos-Figueroa, J. (2022). Populism and democratic erosion: The role of the judiciary. Evidence from Mexico, 2018–2021. Revista de Estudios Políticos, (198), 118–217.
Legal culture, constitutional conventions, and informal institutions:
- Castagnola, A., & González-Ocantos, E. (2024). Argentina’s “Judicial Family:” Mapping family connections in the Argentine provincial federal judiciary. In R. Sanchez-Urribarri, B. Dressel, & A. Stroh (Eds.), Informality and Courts. Edinburgh University Press.
- Šipulová, K., & Kosař, D. (2023). Decay or erosion? The role of informal institutions in challenges faced by democratic judiciaries. German Law Journal, 24(8), 1577–1595.
- Ríos-Figueroa, J., & Pozas-Loyo, A. (2018). Anatomy of an informal institution: The “Gentlemen’s Pact” and judicial selection in Mexico, 1917–1994. International Political Science Review, 39(5), 647–661.
- Tsereteli, N. (2023). Constructing the pyramid of influence: Informal institutions as building blocks of judicial oligarchy in Georgia. German Law Journal, 24(8), 1469–1487. https://doi.org/10.1017/glj.2023.74
- Kosař, D., & Vincze, A. (2023). Constitutional conventions concerning the judiciary beyond the common law. German Law Journal, 24(8), 1503–1519. https://doi.org/10.1017/glj.2023.90
Julio Ríos Figueroa
Julio Ríos Figueroa is a Full Professor in the Department of Law at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM). He earned his PhD in Political Science from New York University. His research focuses on the judiciary, constitutionalism, and the rule of law, with a particular empirical emphasis on Latin America. He is the author of Constitutional Courts as Mediators: Armed Conflict, Civil-Military Relations, and the Rule of Law in Latin America and co-editor (with Gretchen Helmke) of Courts in Latin America, both published by Cambridge University Press.
David Kosar
David Kosař is Professor of Constitutional Law and Director of the Judicial Studies Institute at Masaryk University in Brno. He is the author of Perils of Judicial Self-Government in Transitional Societies (CUP, 2016) and has edited special issues such as Judicial Self-Governance in Europe (German Law Journal, 2018), Informal Judicial Institutions (German Law Journal, 2023), and Chief Justices and Democratic Resilience (I-CON, 2025). His recent work examines court packing, informal judicial institutions, constitutional conventions, the role of chief justices, separation of powers, and democratic resilience. His broader research interests include comparative constitutional law, constitutional theory, judicial studies, political rights, and transitional justice.
Andrea Castagnola
Andrea Castagnola is a Visiting Professor in the Department of Political Science and the Law School at Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. She is the author of Manipulating Courts (Routledge, 2018) and has published articles in leading journals such as British Journal of Political Science, Journal of Politics, Journal of Politics in Latin America, and the International Journal of Constitutional Law. Her research interests include political institutions, judicial politics, gender and justice, and data science.
Nino Tsereteli
Nino Tsereteli is Programme Coordinator at Democracy Reporting International, where she leads Starlight 2.0, a capacity-building project on strategic litigation, and previously worked on the re:constitution programme. Her research focuses on judicial governance and informal judicial institutions. Before joining DRI, she held research positions at Masaryk University (Czechia) and the University of Oslo (Norway). She holds a Doctorate in Law from the University of Oslo.
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