{"id":6438,"date":"2026-07-10T08:00:00","date_gmt":"2026-07-10T06:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/iccal.lat\/?post_type=blog&p=6438"},"modified":"2026-07-09T01:46:30","modified_gmt":"2026-07-08T23:46:30","slug":"transitional-justice-for-venezuela-lessons-from-the-chilean-case","status":"publish","type":"blog","link":"https:\/\/iccal.lat\/en\/blog\/transitional-justice-for-venezuela-lessons-from-the-chilean-case\/","title":{"rendered":"Transitional Justice for Venezuela: Lessons from the Chilean Case"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

This blog post was translated from the original Spanish version by using AI tools.<\/em>
If you encounter any errors, please contact us<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Transitional justice has established itself as a response to address the wounds of societies affected by conflict. Although it is a paradigm within which international norms and jurisprudence have been developed\u2014that is, what we legal professionals often refer to as human rights \u201cstandards\u201d\u2014the truth is that the reality of a transitional process (even though it must be guided by these standards) is, above all, a political process.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this regard, we have been invited to reflect on how different comparative experiences can help us envision a possible transitional justice process in Venezuela. Although every transition has its own particularities and the political processes that shape it, we can draw lessons from other experiences regarding the challenges, opportunities, and obstacles these processes face. Chile has already traveled that path. It is not a perfect model; it has its strengths and weaknesses (Rojas, 2023)<\/a>, but its successes and mistakes offer concrete lessons for any future process in Venezuela.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To organize these lessons, I have found it particularly useful to employ the image of Archimedes\u2019 lever proposed by Leigh Payne, Gabriel Pereira, and Laura Bernal-Berm\u00fadez in their research on transitional justice and economic actors<\/a>. The idea is thought-provoking: progress on each pillar of transitional justice\u2014truth, reparations, justice, and guarantees of non-repetition\u2014depends on the balance between those driving change (victims, civil society, the international community) and those with the power to veto it (the armed forces, economic powers, political elites).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In Chile, no single pillar advanced at the same pace. And that imbalance among the pillars is, perhaps, the most important lesson for Venezuela: one should not wait until everything is resolved to begin, but one must know in advance which areas will face the greatest obstacles\u2014especially when there are actors with the power to veto certain reforms or decisions. In the Chilean case, actors with veto power held, well into the democratic era, a privileged position within the institutional framework itself: appointed senators held seats in Parliament, and Augusto Pinochet remained commander-in-chief of the Army until March 10, 1998. These contextual factors explain why some measures have progressed while others have stalled: as long as these actors retained their share of institutional power, the most sensitive reforms\u2014those related to guarantees of non-repetition\u2014have been the ones most frequently vetoed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Truth: The Most Well-Established Pillar<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Truth was the area where Chile made the most rapid progress. The government that took office in 1990 made it a priority to establish the truth about what had happened, and by May 1990, the first commission had already been established with the aim of contributing to a comprehensive clarification of the truth regarding the most serious human rights violations committed between September 11, 1973, and March 11, 1990. Following various initiatives, the State has officially recognized 43,234 victims of human rights violations committed during the dictatorship: 3,216 people who were executed or disappeared, and 40,018 survivors of political imprisonment and torture (Rojas, 2023).<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This outcome was achieved through a series of commissions\u2014the National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation<\/a> (1990\u20131991), the National Corporation for Reparation and Reconciliation<\/a> (1992\u20131997), the Roundtable on Human Rights<\/a> (1999\u20132000), the Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture<\/a> (2003\u20132005), and the Advisory Commission for the Classification of Victims<\/a> (2010\u20132011)\u2014because no single commission, on its own, was able to cover all victims or all types of violence. The most recent public policy related to the dimension of truth is the National Plan for the Search<\/a> for Missing Persons, launched in 2023. It is a permanent public policy aimed at clarifying the circumstances of the disappearance and\/or death of victims of enforced disappearance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This experience yielded important lessons: the importance of initial political will to drive these initiatives and the importance of a broad mandate. Mandates that are too narrow lead to exclusions. Chile had to create commission after commission because the first one focused only on those who had been executed and disappeared, leaving victims of torture out of the process for years. In this context, a truth process for Venezuela should be designed with broad mandates from the outset and should pay attention to those who lived in exile\u2014a group that is often rendered invisible in transitional justice processes, a factor that is especially relevant in the Venezuelan case, which is characterized by a large diaspora<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Reparations: The Importance of Institutional Continuity<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

The second pillar where significant contributions were made was reparations. Chile implemented mechanisms that combined material and symbolic dimensions: the National Office for Return<\/a> helped 52,557 people return from exile from 70 different countries; the Program for the Recognition of Politically Exonerated<\/a> Persons benefited 86,208 people who lost their jobs for political reasons; and the Program for Reparation and Comprehensive Health Care<\/a> (PRAIS) continues to operate today, more than three decades later, addressing physical and psychological aftereffects.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The key to the progress of this pillar has been its commitment to comprehensiveness, but also its adoption as institutional policy. Reparations have been effective because the state has sustained them over time and has progressively incorporated the collective dimension (museums, sites of memory) alongside the individual one. For Venezuela, this suggests that designing reparations with only the short term in mind is a mistake: what distinguishes a successful program is that it survives changes in government, incorporates a collective dimension with a comprehensive approach, and involves the participation of victims.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Justice: The Most Tenacious Struggle<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Criminal justice was the area that took the longest and depended less on state initiative and more on pressure from the victims themselves and the international community. The key milestone was the arrest of Augusto Pinochet in London in 1998, which triggered what is known as the global \u201ccascade of justice<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this area, more than 824 convictions can be highlighted, with 158 people currently serving sentences (UDP, 2024<\/a>). The process that began in 1998 has gone through different phases that Collins and Bustos (2025)<\/a> characterize with three questions: 1) Will there ever be genuine investigations? (1998\u20132007), 2) Will there ever be real sanctions? (2007\u20132013), 3) Will I live long enough to see justice served? (2013\u2013present).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This progress was made possible by a judiciary that regained its independence, by specialized judges, and by a creative application of international human rights law to overcome obstacles such as amnesty or statutes of limitations. Likewise, in the Chilean context, the international community has played an essential role in this area. For example, a large portion of Chile\u2019s cases before the Inter-American System are linked to the dictatorship, which has also driven cases to the national courts (the Almonacid Arellano<\/a> Case, the \u00d3rdenes Guerra<\/a> Case, the Maldonado Vargas<\/a> Case, and the Vega Gonz\u00e1lez<\/a> Case).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For Venezuela, this means that transitional justice cannot depend solely on the will of a government: it requires a judiciary capable of acting autonomously, international mechanisms willing to sustain that pressure for years, as well as effective coordination with the principle of complementarity inherent in international criminal justice and the principle of subsidiarity with respect to the Inter-American system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Guarantees of non-repetition: the unfinished task<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

This was the pillar where there has been the least progress and the most resistance, above all because the armed forces retained the power to veto institutional reforms well into the democratic era. Furthermore, the legal and institutional framework of the dictatorship (the Constitution), despite having been amended on several occasions, remains (symbolically and legally) an authoritarian enclave. The harshest evidence of this failure came nearly forty years after the coup: a 2023 survey<\/a> showed that 34% of the population considered the military coup to be justified.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Further evidence of this failure was the human rights violations that occurred during the 2019 social unrest<\/a>, which ultimately confirmed that police reforms and the development of an institutional culture of human rights protection had been insufficient. The lesson for Venezuela is that without a profound and sustained transformation\u2014for example, of the security forces\u2014and without public education about what happened, no transition can truly break the cycle of violence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A Contextual Lesson<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

No pillar of transitional justice advances on its own or at the same pace as the others. In Chile, the truth process moved quickly because there was early political openness; justice moved slowly but managed to make headway thanks to judicial creativity and external pressure; and guarantees of non-repetition made almost no progress because the military and authoritarian veto power never fully relented.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For Venezuela, the question should not be how to implement all the pillars comprehensively and simultaneously, but rather to ask where its own leverage lies today: who is pushing, who is vetoing, and what conditions (international support, victim organization, judicial independence) can tip the balance. The Chilean experience does not offer a recipe, but it does show that no progress was accidental: each pillar that worked did so because someone insisted that it work, for years and despite resistance. And the only ones who are always there and pushing forward everywhere in the world are the victims and their families\u2014that is, organized civil society.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Transitional justice has established itself as a response to address the wounds of societies affected by conflict.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":9,"featured_media":6351,"template":"","blog-author":[463],"categorie":[423],"blog-tag":[475,482,492],"class_list":["post-6438","blog","type-blog","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","blog-author-constanza-nunez-donald","categorie-symposia","blog-tag-chile","blog-tag-transitional-justice","blog-tag-venezuela"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"Transitional Justice for Venezuela: Lessons from the Chilean Case | ICCAL<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"What Chile's transitional justice process teaches Venezuela: lessons on truth, reparations, justice, and guarantees of non-repetition.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" 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